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Introduction
Since its origins to the present-day, the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) has had to change dramatically
to overcome new challenges. At first, CAP focused not
only on fulfilling the goals set out in Article 39 of the
Treaty of Rome (increase productivity, assume an
equal standard of living for farmers, and provide
reasonable prices for commodities), but also on correcting
the «changes» that might have emerged. After concen-
trating on prices cuts, CAP also granted subsidies to
farmers. Finally, the current CAP reform (2003) (Di-
rective 1782/2003/CEE; OJ, 2003) modified the reform
of 1992, that is, by substituting the measures of support
prices for direct aids and by introducing the single
payment system (SPS) in 2005/2006.
Furthermore, this reform supported the Rural Deve-
lopment Policy (RDP), which led to increasing interest
towards aids for rural development in Spain during the
period 1990-2007. As Table 1 shows, rural development
subsidies increased by over 400% from 1992 to 2007.
Although most European countries (Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Sweden,
the United Kingdom and Italy) adopted the SPS which
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Abstract
This paper attempts to develop a valuation method for estimating the market value of the single payment system
(SPS) entitlements in the community agricultural policy (CAP) reform. These entitlements are a new agricultural
intangible asset which is not linked to land and has a similar financial performance to bonds. After applying the PERT
method, which was applied to the inherent risk involved in valuing f ixed income assets, and specif ically to the
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Resumen
Valoración de los derechos procedentes del régimen de pago único: aplicación al caso de España
El presente trabajo pretende desarrollar un método de valoración para estimar el valor de mercado de los derechos
generados en el régimen de pago único (RPU) de la reforma de la política agraria comunitaria (PAC), que suponen un
nuevo intangible de naturaleza agraria no ligado a la tierra, cuyo comportamiento financiero puede ser similar al de
los bonos. Partiendo de la metodología PERT aplicada al riesgo inherente en la valoración de activos de renta fija y
en concreto a la incertidumbre de la PAC después del 2013, este método se aplica a la estimación del valor medio de
los títulos en España.
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granted decoupled aids from production in 2005, Spain,
Greece, Finland, France and Netherlands adopted it one
year later.
Currently, the European Commission (EC) has gua-
ranteed and budgeted CAP until 2013. The SPS implies
direct aids being received by farmers. The SPS grants two
kinds of aids, coupled and decoupled, whose distribution
varies in accordance with the decision each country makes.
Spain has opted to partially apply the SPS from the
year 2006. One part of the aid is paid to farmers as a
Table 1. Development of the payments derived from the aids received by Spain (in thousand of euros)
Variable 1990a 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Total value of subsidies 2,243,476 3,096,246 3,265,611 3,855,877 5,327,303 6,230,301
Total direct payments 1,784,669 2,637,439 2,806,805 3,397,071 4,606,055 4,830,977
— Coupled direct payments: Total 1,784,669 2,637,439 2,806,805 3,382,893 4,472,095 4,631,063
• Coupled direct payments: crops 1,213,978 1,978,892 2,212,001 2,756,049 3,754,192 3,798,985
• Coupled direct payments: livestock 570,691 658,547 594,804 626,844 717,903 832,077
— Decoupled direct payments (SFP) 0 0 0 0 0 0
— Set-aside payments 0 0 0 0 89,190 92,502
— Other direct payments 0 0 0 14,178 44,769 107,413
Rural development policies 458,807 458,807 458,807 458,807 721,248 1,399,324
— RDP financed from EU budget 229,103 229,103 229,103 229,103 317,281 877,316
— RDP financed from national budget 229,704 229,704 229,704 229,704 403,968 522,008
Less Favoured Area N/Ab N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total value of subsidies 5,272,982 5,378,882 5,829,725 6,478,043 5,474,793 6,410,873
Total direct payments 3,749,466 3,999,285 4,087,724 4,195,637 4,077,849 4,353,238
— Coupled direct payments: Total 3,445,583 3,629,194 3,672,629 3,858,463 3,988,334 4,264,931
• Coupled direct payments: crops 2,558,063 2,916,448 2,822,034 2,861,022 3,122,420 3,301,737
• Coupled direct payments: livestock 887,521 712,746 850,594 997,441 865,914 963,194
— Decoupled direct payments (SFP) 0 0 0 0 0 0
— Set-aside payments 123,075 140,306 140,649 66,424 67,199 62,637
— Other direct payments 180,808 229,785 274,446 270,750 22,316 25,669
Rural development policies 1,523,516 1,379,597 1,742,001 2,282,406 1,396,944 1,998,223
— RDP financed from EU budget 959,662 746,891 1,118,712 1,439,408 959,274 1,315,926
— RDP financed from national budget 563,854 632,705 623,289 842,998 437,669 682,297
Less Favoured Area N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 59,413
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total value of subsidies 7,021,854 7,240,665 7,760,383 7,562,958 7,800,080 7,665,247
Total direct payments 4,908,992 4,809,448 5,028,778 4,670,394 4,777,268 5,201,558
— Coupled direct payments: Total 4,661,679 4,553,308 4,995,907 4,649,301 1,471,610 1,810,691
• Coupled direct payments: crops 3,454,154 3,238,928 3,628,072 3,239,931 461,054 1,186,421
• Coupled direct payments: livestock 1,207,525 1,314,381 1,367,835 1,409,370 1,010,556 624,270
— Decoupled direct payments (SFP) 0 0 0 0 3,282,811 3,294,005
— Set-aside payments 236,565 246,045 20,983 8,384 6,581 10,497
— Other direct payments 10,748 10,095 11,888 12,709 16,267 86,365
Rural development policies 2,037,769 2,324,770 2,599,069 2,772,634 2,881,159 2,328,000
— RDP financed from EU budget 1,294,882 1,471,685 1,615,896 1,743,628 1,662,785 1,030,600
— RDP financed from national budget 742,888 853,085 983,173 1,029,006 1,218,374 1,297,400
Less Favoured Area 75,093 106,446 132,536 119,930 141,652 135,689
a The payments of each year are from the 1st of December of the current year. b N/A: not available. Source: Own performance from
FEGA and MARM information.
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single payment, while the second part is paid as coupled
payments for production, which are only received if crops
continue to grow or livestock are still bred (see Table 1).
Decoupled aids have brought about important changes
in the development of the agrarian sector. In particular,
the impact of land use and its productivity was modelled
by Gohin (2006), Tranter et al. (2007) and Gorton et
al. (2008), while the influence on land rent was analysed
by Roberts et al. (2003).
The objective of this system was to assure that farmers’
incomes remained stable and that the competitiveness
and the sustainability of European agriculture improved.
Each country member has opted for a different
system to estimate and make SPS payments to farmers
(Kilian and Salhofer, 2008); these payments are made
by assigning entitlements to farmers.
One of the options consists in estimating the SPS
on the direct payments that the farmer receives during
a reference period, which may involve different levels
of SPS for each farmer. This option is known as a histo-
rical model. France, Portugal, and Spain, among other
countries, have opted for this model.
Another option for estimating the SPS involves
calculating the average of all the payments at a national
or regional level (regional model). Finally, the third
option is the mixed model which combines the previous
methods for estimating payments for the different
regions in the same country.
As a result of the application of the SPS, a new agri-
cultural asset has emerged: the entitlement. Farmers
can manage entitlements in various ways, for instance:
purchasing or selling them without land, linking them
to land trade or renting the land. However, it is compul-
sory for both owners and tenants to justify any kind of
eligible land to receive the entitlement payment. Entitle-
ments are unquestionably a new intangible of an admi-
nistrative nature that is not linked to land (Caballer,
2008)1, which may be traded in a more or less competitive
and transparent market, and whose valuation is a ne-
cessity given its novel and special features.
In addition, entitlements may only be traded under
certain conditions when they have been, and can be,
assigned only to those farmers who are officially located
in Spain; although they may be traded between regions,
this practice involves paying a penalty.
Nevertheless farmers have to not only report any
trade entitlement but also the reason why it has been
traded to the Spanish Agrarian Guarantee Fund (FEGA),
there is no obligation to report the market price of the
entitlements. Therefore, such information remains
unknown. At the same time, it is not a speculative market
given the consequences of the uncertain future of
entitlements after 2013. This may imply an adjustment
process within the agrarian sector a consequence of
not having to justify lands to trade entitlements (Moreno-
Pérez and Ortiz, 2008).
According to the FEGA (2007a), a total of 505,945.30
(3.39%) of normal entitlements, 24,535.01 (3.49%) of
withdrawal entitlements and 1,638.50 (2.52%) of
special entitlements, the average of which is 3.39%,
were granted (traded or rented) in the period from 1
February 2007 to 13 September 2007. However, of the
505,945.30 normal entitlements granted, only 135,303.78
(26.7%) corresponded to traded entitlements as most
were (44.6%) rentals involving lands.
The same occurred with the transfers of withdrawal
entitlements as only 5,033 (20.5%) were owing to
tradability reasons of the entitlements, although there
was an even greater number corresponding to rentals
involving lands (12,495.85; 50.9%).
On the other hand, 64.4% of withdrawal entitlements
being transferred were owing to tradability reasons,
while only 5% corresponded to rentals.
After analysing the status of the entitlements market
in Spain, we discover two different parts: the annual
rent received per entitlement and the market value of
the entitlement.
As FEGA published rents each year, rents are certain
and known facts. Nevertheless, there are notorious
differences between the average values of entitlements
among the Spanish Autonomous Communities (ACs).
So the results and the factors that determine such
differences are interesting to analyse.
Several studies have analysed the features that
determine rental and land values (Gracia et al., 2004;
Caballer and Guadalajara, 2005), particularly the CAP
subsidies received by farmers (Lagerkvist, 2005; Sala
and Torres, 2007; Patton et al., 2008), and also some
of them have proposed a valuation model in accordance
with these features.
Furthermore, according to Beard and Swinbank
(2001), those bonds (entitlements), to which the owner
confers the right to receive these future compensation
payments, will have a value which reflects the market’s
1 Intangible assets may be of either an administrative nature, such as the milk production quotas, or a technological nature, such
as official certificates of origin.
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present valuation of these future payments. In this way,
the market value of an entitlement is most probably the
estimation of the value of an entitlement that could be
traded in the free market.
By taking all this into account, we see that there is
a need to evaluate new entitlements and that works
which centre on this approach are lacking. Consequently,
the main objective of this paper is to propose a va-
luation model to estimate the theoretical market value
of SPS entitlements in Spain. The purpose of estimating
this value is two-fold; on the one hand, it affords this
market greater transparency and efficiency while, on
the other hand, it enables aids to be put to better use
and, possibly, better EU financing for Spanish agriculture.
Furthermore, it would help resolve the problems
related to valuing rural land in those cases in which
entitlements do not correspond to the land owner.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 focuses
on the application of the SPS and on the origin of
farming entitlements in Spain. Section 2 analyses the
differences in entitlement rents among the ACs. Besides,
Section 3 develops a valuation model to estimate the
theoretical value of the entitlements in the market,
which takes this value as being similar to financial assets
and securities. Section 4 shows the research results of
the average entitlement rent in Spain in such a way that
the market value obtained from the entitlement is
merely a mean national value, which will vary in terms
of the entitlement rent in each case. Finally, Section 5
presents the main conclusions of the paper.
Application of the SPS in Spain
In Spain, the total direct payments received by
farmers in 2006 and 2007 were €4,777 and €5,021
million, respectively. Of these amounts, 68.7%
(3,282,811) and 63.3% (3,294,005) were received as
decoupled aids, respectively, through the SPS each year
(see Table 1).
A single payment is estimated by the mean aid
received during the three-year period 2000/2001/2002,
with some exceptions: a) olive oil, 1999-2003 (the
1999/2000 campaign to the 2002-2003 campaign); b)
sugar cane (2003-2005); c) sugar beet (2004-2006); d)
flax and hemp (2001-2002).
Given the considerable differences in the direct aids
received by each sector and each AC during the reference
period 2000-2002 as a result of the notable sectorial
and territorial differences in Spanish agricultural
production, a historical model has been adopted.
Likewise, this historical model has been adopted to
maintain part of the coupled aids in order to face the
risk of a more or less generalised abandonment of the
farming activity owing to low productivity of dry crops
and extensive cattle raising.
In order to receive entitlement payments, farmers
have to justify land.
The surface areas for which SPS entitlements may
apply are those farms whose lands are used for growing
crops and permanent grazing, except for those lands
occupied by permanent crops or forests or those used for
activities other than agriculture. In Spain, approxima-
tely 75% of the utilized agricultural area (UAA) may put
such entitlements to good use. The remaining 25% is
made up of some 4.5 million hectares which have no enti-
tlements because they are either fallow or forage lands.
Moreover, farmers will receive direct payments if
cross-compliance requirements are met. Farmers must
comply with the provisions of 18 European Directives
(Directive 1782/2003/CEE; OJ, 2003) in the areas of
public, animal and plant health, the environment and
animal welfare, and in keeping land in good agricultural
and environmental conditions (GAEC) (Annexe IV of
this directive). More recently, the European Council
Regulation 146/2008 (OJ, 2008) has amended both
European Council Regulation 1782/2003, which esta-
blishes common rules for direct support schemes under
the CAP as well as certain support schemes for farmers,
and European Council Regulation 1698/2005 (OJ,
2005) on the support for rural development through
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
(EAFRD). The amendments cover minor cases of non-
compliance with the cross-compliance requirements
established in the CAP.
In Spain, Royal Decree 2352/2004 (BOE, 2004) is
the main legal act that addresses cross-compliance at
a national level.
Several studies into the impact of Good Farming
Practices requirements for being eligible to participate
in European Rural Development Programmes have
been carried out (e.g., Calatrava et al., 2007). This
study concluded that the new environmental requirements
regarding the SPS have a positive effect on the adoption
of conservation practices.
Those entitlements derived from the aids available
for surface areas, and from the bonuses and supple-
mentary aids obtained by farms with surface areas, are
accounted as follows: 1 entitlement = 1 hectare or
fraction of hectare.
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As regards supplementary livestock bonuses and aids
obtained by farms without surface areas, the number of
entitlements is calculated as so: number of entitlements
= amount of reference/5,000. In this way, three kinds
of entitlements exist: normal, special and withdrawal.
The value of each entitlement will be calculated by
dividing the reduced reference amount once the 3%
destined to the National Reserve, and any other appli-
cable discount, have been deducted (applying Article
69 EC Regulation 1782/2003 and the financial discipline,
for example) by the number of entitlements.
As Table 2 shows, the average value2 of entitlements in
Spain in the 2006 Campaign was €224.26, although there
were many differences between types of entitlements:
— The average value of compulsory withdrawal of
lands, or withdrawal entitlements (through the direct
aids received for the compulsory withdrawal of lands)
was €167.33. After the SPS was set up, the entitlement
for the compulsory withdrawal of herbaceous crops
(cereals, oil seed crops and protein crops) was set at 10%.
In 2008, the EC proposed to set the percentage of
compulsory withdrawal of lands for forthcoming sowing
times at 0% as a reaction to the situation in which the
cereal market is.
— The average value of each eligible hectare, or
normal entitlement, was €217.26.
— The average values in those situations subjected
to special conditions, that is, for special entitlements
2 In colloquial language, the value of entitlements is related to the annual income of the entitlements. This concept differs from
the market or fair value of entitlements which would be the price an entitlement would be most probably traded at in the market.
Table 2. Assigned entitlements during 2006 and 2007
Autonomous Kind of
Number Number Paymentsb Average value
community entitlementsa
of granters of entitlements (€) per entitlement (€)
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007
Andalusia E 6,916 5,146 9,416 6,989 24,279,572 17,535,361 2,579 2,509
N 264,047 266,324 3,191,102 3,237,034 1,227,497,681 1,234,623,374 385 381
R 10,651 10,807 97,224 98,878 20,573,854 20,568,918 212 208
Total 270,598 271,197 3,297,742 3,342,900 1,272,351,107 1,272,727,653 386 381
Aragon E 1,930 1,203 3,518 2,416 11,970,196 8,475,661 3,403 3,508
N 50,604 49,583 1,232,409 1,233,517 271,846,088 271,141,932 221 220
R 10,600 10,314 76,070 75,948 11,825,118 11,625,370 155 153
Total 52,343 50,646 1,311,997 1,311,878 295,641,401 291,242,963 225 222
Asturias E 4,058 1,736 4,881 1,999 8,780,767 2,790,479 1,799 1,396
N 9,616 11,502 210,260 212,049 28,417,365 33,781,529 135 159
R
Total 13,229 12,984 215,141 214,048 37,198,131 36,572,008 173 171
Baleares E 916 837 942 861 698,757 575,430 742 668
N 4,893 4,957 84,780 84,557 14,430,652 14,302,631 170 169
R 473 472 2,563 2,563 407,579 400,900 159 156
Total 5,796 5,766 88,285 87,978 15,536,988 15,278,961 176 174
Cantabria E 2,324 1,278 3,354 1,840 8,910,365 4,703,535 2,657 2,556
N 3,264 4,215 134,094 136,161 16,491,658 20,272,396 123 149
R 29 29 97 97 21,041 20,725 217 214
Total 5,557 5,465 137,545 138,098 25,423,063 24,996,655 185 181
Castile-La Mancha E 3,149 2,504 4,881 4,057 14,808,489 12,510,358 3,034 3,084
N 129,718 130,199 2,734,430 2,767,219 388,216,987 395,740,127 142 143
R 16,477 17,078 162,723 169,668 24,920,624 25,598,643 153 151
Total 132,614 132,454 2,902,034 2,940,938 427,946,100 433,849,129 147 148
Castile-Leon E 4,877 2,370 7,152 3,641 20,787,686 10,968,988 2,907 3,013
N 95,684 94,492 3,517,924 3,547,144 573,564,522 587,366,120 163 166
R 31,136 29,845 267,178 269,014 42,109,359 41,728,594 158 155
Total 100,228 96,624 3,792,254 3,819,799 636,461,567 640,063,702 168 168
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(for livestock bonuses received by farms without a
surface area basis), was €2,447.72.
In 2006, there were a total of 864,078 beneficiaries
who received aids, most of which were normal entitle-
ments that amounted to 820,418, while there were
859,700 beneficiaries in 2007.
The total number of definitive entitlements in the
2006 Campaign was 15,709,937, of which 65,043 corres-
Table 2 (cont.). Assigned entitlements during 2006 and 2007
Autonomous Kind of
Number Number Paymentsb Average value
community entitlementsa
of granters of entitlements (€) per entitlement (€)
2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007 2006 2007
Cataluña E 1,461 1,515 2,535 2,712 7,921,072 8,425,283 3,125 3,107
N 53,255 55,371 710,476 704,404 179,871,501 181,625,638 253 258
R 4,195 4,274 20,389 20,702 4,113,107 4,108,054 202 198
Total 54,617 56,787 733,4 727,816 191,905,681 194,158,976 262 267
Extremadura E 4,014 2,625 5,382 3,476 12,990,361 7,973,538 2,414 2,294
N 70,843 72,072 1,770,645 1,777,855 272,875,086 275,109,457 154 155
R 5,469 5,484 40,128 40,367 6,776,156 6,724,380 169 167
Total 74,542 74,394 1,816,155 1,821,692 292,641,602 289,807,375 161 159
Galicia E 8,045 7,419 9,406 8,733 17,336,678 15,979,305 1,843 1,830
N 38,346 38,441 326,037 323,276 89,149,132 89,038,594 273 275
R 34 34 118 119 24,144 23,896 205 201
Total 44,927 44,384 335,561 332,128 106,509,953 105,041,795 317 316
Madrid E 487 281 838 485 2,600,477 1,492,113 3,103 3,077
N 7,347 7,522 208,888 206,328 25,373,687 26,036,951 121 126
R 887 886 6,735 6,732 1,133,573 1,117,406 168 166
Total 7,825 7,791 216,461 213,545 29,107,738 28,646,470 134 134
Murcia E 1,265 1,149 2,148 2,105 6,691,748 6,616,168 3,115 3,143
N 8,684 8,784 87,046 88,001 20,460,586 20,627,246 235 234
R 448 448 4,554 4,588 522,437 523,396 115 114
Total 9,888 9,869 93,748 94,694 27,674,771 27,766,810 295 293
Navarra E 1,323 804 2,140 1,481 5,983,308 4,574,907 2,796 3,089
N 17,467 17,703 304,252 308,189 58,695,367 59,784,046 193 194
R 2,772 2,745 16,269 16,303 3,236,283 3,194,453 199 196
Total 18,734 18,456 322,661 325,971 67,914,957 67,553,405 210 207
País Vasco E 5,009 3,894 5,909 4,757 8,090,443 7,079,152 1,369 1,488
N 6,739 7,757 123,713 124,438 22,794,503 23,738,207 184 191
R 1,030 962 4,873 4,854 1,187,289 1,164,538 244 240
Total 11,715 11,597 134,495 134,049 32,072,235 31,981,897 238 239
La Rioja E 364 245 615 449 1,922,834 1,507,922 3,127 3,358
N 6,646 6,668 117,654 116,400 16,380,931 16,739,582 139 144
R 529 516 2,641 2,633 549,197 537,512 208 204
Total 6,978 6,889 120,910 119,482 18,852,962 18,785,016 156 157
Valencia E 1,316 1,150 1,926 1,740 5,434,117 4,883,110 2,821 2,806
N 53,265 53,344 187,519 185,738 40,131,454 39,830,089 214 214
R 320 324 2,103 2,104 342,557 337,719 163 161
Total 54,487 54,397 191,548 189,580 45,908,128 45,050,918 240 238
TOTAL E 47,454 34,156 65,043 47,741 159,206,869 116,091,311 2,448 2,432
N 820,418 828,934 14,941,229 15,052,237 3,246,197,199 3,289,757,919 217 219
R 85,050 84,218 703,665 714,561 117,742,317 117,674,504 167 165
Total 864,078 859,700 15,709,937 15,814,513 3,523,146,385 3,523,523,735 224 223
a E: Special entitlements, N: normal entitlements, R: withdrawal entitlements. b This amount should be reduced a 4% of the mo-
dulation and «other reasons» for obtaining the real payments of the SPS in 2007 shown in Table 1. Source: Own performance from
data provided by FEGA (2006, 2007b).
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ponded to special entitlements, 14,941,229 to normal
entitlements and 703,665 to withdrawal entitlements.
In 2007, the total number of definite entitlements rose
slightly to 15,814,513.
Non-usage of the entitlements assigned in 2006 
was 2.94%, a percentage which went down to 1.21% in
2007.
Few variations were observed in 2007. The average
value of the assigned entitlement was slightly lower,
€222.8. The same occurred with the special entitlements
and the withdrawal entitlements whose values were
€164.68 and €2,431.69, respectively. On the other hand,
the value of the normal entitlements increased slightly
to the amount of €218.56.
Large differences exist among the ACs, as Figure 1
shows. The average entitlement value in Spain in 2006
was €224.26. The lowest entitlement value went to 
the Madrid Community, €134.47, while the highest
entitlement value of €385.82 was received in Andalusia.
Canary Islands are not included at Figure 1 since they
are not affected by the SPS (see Table 2).
A similar situation took place with normal entitle-
ments, whose lowest and highest values were €384.66
and €121.47, respectively, for the same two ACs. This
situation was seen once more in 2007. The average
value of entitlements was €222.8; the highest value
was noted in Andalusia (€380.73) while the lowest was
reported in Madrid (€134.15).
With regard to special entitlements, Aragon received
the highest average values with €3,402.56 in 2006 and
€3,508.14 in 2007, which is possibly a result of this
AC having a highly developed livestock sector.
Method and sources of information
The methodology used to explain the factors that
determine the differences of entitlement rent (R) among
the ACs was Pearson’s coefficient correlation.
In addition, the fair value of entitlements (P) (bonds)
was estimated by applying the Program Evaluation and
Review Technique-Time (PERT-Time) methodology
(Suárez, 2007). This method applies different distribution
functions: rectangular, triangular, beta and, more
recently, trapezoidal (Herrerías et al., 1999, 2003; Van
Dorp et al., 2007).
This value (P) will depend on the possession, or not,
of land. So, there are two possibilities:
— If an applicant does not own land: P = 0, so the
rent (R) is null.
— If an applicant owns the land: the f inancial
features of the entitlements are similar to bonds. Financial
Figure 1. Distribution of the average value of entitlements (R) by Autonomous Communities in
2006 and 2007.
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assets exist where rents are known and constant. The
theoretical market value of the entitlement may be
expressed by the expression known in the f inancial
world of capitalisation of rents (Suárez, 2007):
[1]
where Pt = the theoretical value of the entitlement in
year t or at the time of valuation; Ri = rent3 to receive
in year I; Pn = the expected value of the entitlement
traded in year n; n = the number of years of the entitlement
has been possessed; k = the interest rate, which is
constant every year.
As the entitlement rent, R, is practically constant
every year and given the hypothesis that the entitlement
is in the owners’ hands until it expires, equation [1]
would be as follows:
[2]
where ε is the discount rate.
In accordance with the current CAP regulation, 
rent R is only known and certain until 2013. After
2013, any risk will have to be considered. It is possi-
ble that the entitlement value will decrease, or we 
may even be pessimistic and contemplate the CAP
disappearing, which would imply farmers not re-
ceiving any aids. Therefore, the annual rent to receive
for entitlements is considered a random variable Dtr
after 2013.
The expression [2], therefore, is:
if 2006 ≤ t ≤ 2013
if 2014 ≤ t ≤ n [3]
where v is the number of years the entitlement is expected
to continue beyond 2013, that is, the estimated period
of risk.
R is perfectly determined and D is the random
variable Dtr under the hypothesis of a rectangular
distribution function where all the possible values are
between the minimum and maximum values (Dtp , Dt0).
Therefore, they have the same probability (Suárez,
2007). Such a distribution has the following density
function:
[4]
The mean and the variance are shown by the following
expressions:
[5]
[6]
From a financial perspective, farming entitlements
may be considered bonds. This similarity makes it
convenient to capitalise annual entitlement rents at the
same rate of interest as bonds (10-30 years).
In the same way as evaluating land, the interest rate
while evaluating entitlements may vary in the short or
long term (Wong et al., 2008). Accordingly, the interest
rate risk considered is estimated as a random variable,
ktr, which may vary in the numerical range (ktp, kt0) in
accordance with a density function f(ktr) (Pérez, 1992,
1997).
Obviously, the discount rate will also
be a random variable, and it will present values bet-
ween the numerical interval .
In this particular case, triangular distribution 
was considered followed by ktr with a modal ktm value
as there was enough information available to model 
it, it was more operative than the beta distribution
(Romero, 1977; García et al., 1999; Caballer, 2008)
and fits the historic values better than the rectangular
distribution.
If discount rate ktr is adjusted to the triangular model,
its density function is:
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[7]
Pérez (1997) showed that the density function of the
discount factor εtr to be as follows:
[8]
The mean and variance may be expressed as:
[9]
The information sources and the data used in the
study to explain the normal entitlements rent for 2006
and 2007 per AC have been obtained from different
sources. The regressions of the empirical studies con-
ducted to account for land value in Spain, as cited earlier,
in the United States (Xu et al., 1993; Barnard et
al.,1997; Shi et al., 1997) include variables related to
the farms’ characteristics (size), some which account
for agricultural productivity (temperature, rainfall),
and others with no agricultural influence given their
possible alternative uses (tourism, demographic pressure,
location), and others of an economic kind (inflation,
taxes, salaries). Consequently, the data have been
divided into four groups of variables, climatic features,
economic context, location and demography, which are
shown as follows:
Climatic features
Rainfall (X1): the average annual rainfall (in mm)
of each AC for the period 1971-2000. This informa-
tion was obtained from the Food and Agriculture
Statistics Year Book in Spain of 2006, published by the
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery and Food
(www.marm.es; MAPA, 2006a). It has a constant value
for each year.
Average temperature (X2): measured by the annual
temperature (in °C) of each AC over the period 1971-
2000. This information was also obtained from MAPA
(2006a). It is a constant value for each year.
Economic context
Price of non-subsidised housing (X3): a registry of
the price per square metre for the third quarter of 2006
and 2007 of each AC. This information was obtained
from the Spanish Ministry of Housing (www.mviv.es).
Beds in hotels (X4): a registry of the number of
estimated beds in hotels of each AC for 2006 and 2007.
The data were obtained from the Spanish National
Statistics Institute (INE, www.ine.es).
Number of apartments (X5): a registry of the
number of estimated beds in tourist apartments in each
AC for 2006 and 2007. The data were obtained from
the INE.
Consumers price index (X6): the variation of an
annual index of consumer prices for each AC, for 2006
and 2007. The data were obtained from the INE.
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Interest rate (X7): is published by the Exchequer
(www.tesoro.es).
Occupational population in the agrarian sector
(X8): the rate of employment in each AC. It is presented
as a percentage which is calculated as the total number
of the working population in the agrarian sector over
the total number of the working population for each
AC in 2006 and 2007. The data were obtained from the
INE.
UAA (X9): this is calculated in hectares for each AC.
The data were obtained from the INE.
Rural property tax /UAA (X10): a total tax liability
paid per hectare of the UAA in 2006. This value was
estimated by the information provided by the State
Property Registry of the Spanish Ministry of Economy
and Finance and INE. Each AC presents a value.
Land value per crop (X11,…,X18): the average land
value in each AC was obtained from the survey of land
prices published yearly by MAPA (2006b, 2007).
Crops included dry lands (X11), irrigated lands (X12),
dry land-transformed vineyards (X13), irrigation-
transformed vineyards (X14), dried fruits grown on dry
lands (X15), irrigation-transformed olive groves (X16),
pastures (X17), and meadowlands (X18).
Size of farms (X19): this data was obtained by
dividing the UAA by the number of farms (MAPA,
2006c).
Geographical location
Coastlines (X20): calculated by the number of kilo-
metres of coastline in each AC.
Surface area of the ACs (X21): the surface area of
each AC is presented as km2.
Demography
Population Density (X22): the number of inhabitants
in the AC divided by the surface area of each AC presented
as km2. This information was derived from the INE and
was only available for 2001 since farming censuses are
done only once every 10 years.
The values of the annual rents per entitlement
(X23) are those previously shown in Table 2.
Finally, a matrix was created with 23 columns or
variables, and 32 rows or observations corresponding
to the 16 ACs affected by the SPS in the years 2006
and 2007.
Results
The statistically signif icant variables of 99% 
and 95% over the entitlements values are shown 
in Table 3. The non-signif icant variables have been
omitted.
The price of olive groves shows a high correlation
with the rents of normal entitlements for the years 2006
and 2007 and, to a lesser extent, with the price of
irrigation land. This influence is due to the fact that
the SPS-granted entitlement rents are estimated by
considering historical subsidies which were mainly
based on land productivity. The second factor in this
correlation is the rural property tax. These taxes are
higher on the more productive lands and entitlement
values are also higher. In third place we f ind hotel
occupancy. The ACs with more tourism, as a non-
agricultural influence, more coastline and warmer
temperatures, which lead to greater land productivity,
are characterized by higher average values, just as the
cited literature depicts. Finally, the surface area of each
AC has a positive effect on the average value of normal
entitlements, although this happens to a lesser extent
in Andalusia and Castile-Leon.
In terms of estimating the theoretical market value
of entitlements in Spain, it was assumed that one
entitlement had an annual average rent value of
€217.26 (see Table 2). The minimum, maximum and
modal values of the discount rate have been established
at 4.87%, 11.45% and 5.5%, respectively, according
to the historical database from 1992-2008 published
by the Exchequer.
A risk period time horizon is also considered and
consists of 8 additional years beyond 2013, which takes
us to 2021.
Table 3. Results of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient with
the «Normal Entitlements» variable for 2006/2007
Explanatory variable Coefficient1
Value of olive groves 0.812**
Rural property tax 0.712**
Beds in hotels 0.643**
Coastlines 0.612**
Value of irrigation land 0.439*
Surface area of the ACs 0.436*
Average temperature 0.430*
Number of apartments 0.413*
1 *,**: The correlation is significant at the level of 0.05 and
0.01 respectively (bilateral).
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The stochastic independence of the D’ and ε variables
is assumed, whose means and variances are known:
€109 and 0.9323 for the means and 3,933 and 0.0002
for the variances, respectively. These figures have been
estimated according to the expressions [5], [6], [9] and
[10], and by applying the known relationships for the
addition and product of random variable (see Table 4
for the results).
The theoretical average market value of a normal
entitlement in Spain in 2006 (the first year of entitle-
ments) was €1,771, which reduces over time given its
hypothetical existence until 2021, and whose value is
the same as the rent of that year. In contrast, the risk
increases over time with a variation coefficient from
1% to 58% in 2021.
Obviously, the value of those entitlements whose
annual rent is higher than the annual average rent will
be higher than the estimated value shown in Table 4,
and vice versa.
Conclusions
The CAP of 2003 has meant an important change in
the way direct aids are received. The SPS consists in
assigning entitlements to farmers which become a
subsidy or annual rent. The single payment method
adopted has been the historical model. Farmers receive
a single payment per land. The single payment is
estimated by the mean aid received during the three-
year period 2000/2001/2002, and important differences
are noted among the ACs. As a result of the SPS, the
ACs with more olive groves and irrigated lands, greater
tourist development and warmer temperatures present
higher average entitlement rent values.
In contrast, the fact that land entitlement became
independent has brought about a new market of entitle-
ments whose theoretical value can be estimated analo-
gically with estimations of bonds. The application of
the PERT method has conveniently introduced a risk
factor into the proposed valuation model which is pre-
sented in two different ways: firstly in relation to the
entitlement rent due to the uncertain future of the CAP
after 2013, and secondly in relation to risk concerning
the interest rate in the bonds market of recent years.
Consequently, the theoretical market value of the
entitlement decreases over time and its value will depend
on not only the rent associated with the entitlement,
but also on the time horizon considered.
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